A fiscalização da função social da propriedade rural como instrumento de governança agrária

Abstract

The Social Role of Rural Property, a recent achievement of Brazilian society, was consolidated in the Federal Constitution of 1988, by which the Union was charged with the duty of monitoring its compliance through the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) and, supplementarily, the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) and the Ministry of Labour and Employment (MTE) for environmental and labor concerns, respectively. However, such an important means of governance has not been fully exploited, especially to the resolution of agrarian conflicts given its expropriation power in cases of noncompliance with the social role and agrarian reform. In view of the current regulatory framework and institutional apparatus, the present study focuses on describing the reasons why inspection is made less strict. Therefore, the discussion is based on the assumptions that: (a) state bureaucracy and current regulations hinder and delay inspection and that; (b) both the poor integration among inspection bodies/entities; and, c) the political and economic influence of big landowners contribute to a less effective inspection of rural property and its social role. Following the same path, the general objective of the study is to analyze the motivations that mitigate inspection of the social role of rural property and agrarian governance by identifying methods and techniques used by agencies/entities of the federal inspection system and describing the reasons/difficulties that impact on inspection. Relations between inspection and agrarian governance are also addressed. The research is of applied nature. As for objectives, it is descriptive. As for approach, it is qualitative and quantitative given the relationships among variables. As for technical procedures, it is bibliographic and documentar. The data analyzed are secondary, from bibliographic and documentary surveying. The study reveals that although INCRA, IBAMA and MTE form the federal apparatus responsible for the social role of rural property, it is INCRA that represents the Union in inspection matters following cadastral and field inspection methods. Joint inspections, which account for 39% of the total, are made difficult by significant differences. All assumptions on which the study is based are confirmed, especially the political influence from big landowners, that delays regulation of laws and prevent updating of productivity rates. Enforcement of the social role of rural property is a means of agrarian governance, an indicator of resolution of agrarian conflicts being created (Resconflict) by which both are correlated. Finally, it is concluded that expropriation of large rural properties involved in environmental and labor violations would solve the existing land problem in the State of Paraná would be solved.