Persuasão em Wittgenstein

Abstract

Persuasion in Wittgenstein remains a topic still scarcely addressed in philosophical literature, whether due to the scarcity of direct references in the author’s texts or to restrictive interpretations of its meaning. This work aims to shed light on the theme and to support the thesis that persuasion, in Wittgenstein, constitutes a philosophical-therapeutic practice of reorienting the interlocutor’s gaze to consider as legitimate perspectives different from their own. The therapeutic sense of this practice emerges from the context of his later philosophy and maintains a close relation to his conception of language and of philosophy. In contrast to the dogmatic mode of persuading, the philosopher seeks to persuade in the opposite direction, leading the interlocutor toward overcoming dogmatism. Persuasion is understood as a therapy of images, insofar as, by mobilizing the subject’s will to recognize the legitimacy of distinct perspectives, it frees them from the structures of thought that imprison them. Thus, it is possible to recognize the applicability of this conception of persuasion to the dissolution of conflicts between different world-pictures and world-views. Furthermore, certain strategies or skills employed by Wittgenstein to persuade can be identified—what we refer to here as “arts of persuasion”. In conclusion, it is inferred that, in the Wittgensteinian sense, persuasion constitutes a philosophical-therapeutic practice which, though originally applied to philosophical problems, may also contribute to addressing non-philosophical issues, insofar as it promotes dialogue as a means of overcoming the contemporary challenges that pervade public debate.